I hope what follows is a copy of the last (corrected) draft...
ABOUT FRANCE
The remains of the Belle Époque
Text: Sylvester Hoogmoed
Dirigisme
France is often thought primarily to be an agricultural country. Protesting vigorously, farmers frequently hold the limelight and the many tourists, that visit every year the underpopulated rural departments, overlook the overpopulated regions of concentrated industrial activity. Although in the European Union France is responsible for the greater part of farming produce, less than ten percent of the French work in the agricultural sector, contributing not even five percent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Frequent protests against GATT-agreements merely reflect the vulnerability of the French farmers, who fear free international competition as much as they hate modernisation. Another (related) misconception about the French economy concerns a presumed lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Many complain that French society has been blocked since the days of minister Colbert (1619-1683), who introduced a system of "dirigisme": central economic and social planning. The Industrial Revolution - which despite this took place all the same - brought to power about two hundred manufacturers and their families, but these "nouveaux riches", although despised by the old nobility for being too "nouveaux", soon became respectable members of the establishment, hardly making French society more dynamic. David Thomson described the Third Republic (1870-1940) as being haunted by history: "Frenchmen thought incorrigibly in historical terms" (Thomson, 1958, p.36). Despite modernisations after the war, many the French society has remained essentially retrospective and defensive. According to the prominent anthropologist and politician Alain Peyrefitte even low birth rates were the symptom of a disease making the French "méfiante devant la vie, réticente à en affronter les risques (Peyrefitte, 1976,p.124).
France certainly lacks the liberty which dynamic capitalists consider a challenge in the United States. Neither is it a social democracy like Germany, were the employers, employees and central government run the economy collectively. Even during the socialist governments of the Mitterrand-era, the badly organised labour movement hardly gained power. But, being capitalist neither à l'Américaine nor social democratic, the French, in
their own dreamy way, have built themselves a relatively wealthy country. Especially during the period between 1945 and 1975 the economic growth was impressive. That boom was guided by a series of central plans and a big public sector, thus state dirigisme does not seem to do the French economy much harm. Probably liberalising the economy could increase industrial growth, but it certainly would endanger a big sector in the French economy: tourism. For are not most of the overworked holidaymakers visiting France every year attracted by just the comforting remains of the "Belle Époque"? Thanks to economic growth the characteristic "Deux Chevaux" has already disappeared from the routes national, is MacDonald's invading every big town, and have at camping sites even the (in)famous urinal-like toilets been normalised. The most important consequence of economic modernisation is the disapearance of French farmers. Many little rural communities in the country are depopulating. Not only foreign tourists, but also French townsmen fear the French way of life, involving more than just garlic, cheese and wine, is disapearing together with the farmers. Cultural, rather than economic importance gives the French rural sector political influence.
Illusions
Of the Big Three, France is, at first sight, politically the most unstable. The Fifth Republic was established by general De Gaulle (1959) to prevent a coup during the outrageous process of decolonalisation in Algeria. However, being very obscure, and giving immense powers to the president, the remedying new constitution merely introduced a kind of "perpetual coup"; at least, that was (until he became president himself) the opinion of François Mitterrand. President De Gaulle indeed ruled like a prince and for a while brought some stability, but he was not the uncontroversial pater patriae he became after his death, and what became known as "the events of Mai 1968" looked like revolution. Like king Louis-Phillipe some 140 years earlier, De Gaulle at one moment even seems to have fled the country, making a mysterious trip to Baden-Baden. The students revolted, protesting against the Spartan philosophies of the Minister of Education Alain Peyrefitte, and the workers striked, requiring after some fifteen years of economic growth their share of welfare. In the end they failed to seize power, but in paralysing the country, they proved the traditional French inclination to rebelliousness was still to be reckoned with. Charles de Gaulle referred to "cette sorte de vertige que l'on éprouve fréquement chez nous" (cited in Thomson, 1958, p.295). The large following of extremist political parties like the Front National and the Parti Communiste also points to a fundamental political instability.
In France an ingrained democratic political society has never come into existence. The French generally vote massively, but they are not involved in politics; neither political parties nor interest groups have a large following, and there is a gap between the central authorities in Paris and the voters. In French society the basis for all is, according to Thomson (1958,p.122), humanism, "ranging from an extreme individualism, which is tantamount to anarchism, to a respect for small and intense human communities (...)". The parliament, often called "a theatre of illusions" (Smith, 1972, p.158), works like a kind of lightning conductor, in which the - often leftist - ideals of the cultural élite are propagated by colourful, charismatic, but rather powerless orators. Meanwhile, the actual - often "rightist" - policies of the French successive administrations are, amidst all the political outrage and (corruption) scandals, remarkable consistent. Although the executive powers of the government and - above all - president, have been considerably enlarged by De Gaulle, the cause of this consistency is to be found elsewhere. For although the Fifth Republic brought some political stability, ministers still frequently change office, and the presidents during their successive "septenats" hardly went beyond the controversies and scandals of daily political life. Furthermore the consistency of policy existed well before the Fifth Republic, surviving the Fourth and Third Republic, the empire of Napoleon III, the Second Republic, the Orléans and Bourbon monarchies, and even the defeat at Waterloo. It is the renowned and powerful Civil Service which, throughout the history of French turmoil, has been able to guarantee a considerable degree of decision-making and long-term planning.
French public servants are given a lot of prestige, and rather than entering into business, many a graduate aspires to enter the prestigious École National d'Administration (ENA), where the greater part of the administrative elite receives an excellent training. Thus in France decisions are mostly made by the experts, whereas the French frequently vent their displeasure on the politicians and on the streets. Only their concrete complaints about administrative decisions have a chance to reach the real authorities: they are judged by the independent "Council of State", which also gives its opinion about proposed bills. A lack of democracy, rather than a lack of fundamental stability is therefore the key characteristic of French politics. Major decisions, like about the nuclear program, have been taken in an incremental way, without any politician feeling responsible, let alone putting the case in front of the electors. The latter may be asked to give their opinion on certain issues by way of referenda, but these are widely considered to be presidential opinion-polls, instead of possibilities to judge policies. Nevertheless, the radical policies of the socialist-communist Mauroys governments (1981-1983) proved that France is not yet a technocracy, although from the European states it probably comes nearest to it.
Fighting cocks
France traditionally has been noted for a high developed sense of national identity. One of the reasons is that it has had relatively fixed borders from at least the Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), which, besides, also brought the most famous national hero: Joan of Arc. But it was only with the great revolution (1789), when the masses seized power, that nationalism became a major political force in France, and after that in the whole of Europe, indeed in the whole world. The quality of the cultural inheritance is certainly another important reason for the force of French nationalism. Corneille, Molière, Racine, Hugo, Sartre, Camus: no schoolmaster witholds them from their students. Revealingly the French system of education is called "l'éducation nationale". But the most significant cause of national homogeneity in France is paradoxically the opposite force of Gallic individualism. The aversion to big social movements like the political parties and interest groups has created a nation state where "the society" does not exist: "il n'y a que des individus, et la France" (Peyrefitte, 1976,p.94) . Therefore religious, political, and class conflict have never split up the country, and neither did regional movements of independence.
Today only a small group of separatist Corsican terrorists occasionally give cause for some alarm. Conflicts between monarchists and republicans on the one hand, and State and Church on the other have both been settled before the First World War, when France peremptorily became a secular republic (1905). A class conflict never culminated in open struggle, despite the Leftist popular front governments of Léon Blum (1936-7 & 1938) and the semi-fascist Vichy régime of Marshall Pétain (1940-1944). After the war the flourishing Communist Party was essentially a party of rebellion, attracting for example many "red farmers", who certainly did not fight for communist collective farming. There is one big split in France: the rural-urban contrast is much clearer than elsewhere. However, the rural "communes" are too small to undermine national cohesion, over ninety percent of them have under two thousand inhabitants. Of old, the degree of centralisation in France has been enormous. Since the days of Napoleon I the country has been divided in about a hundred departments, in which local authorities were supervised by a Parisian prefect. Only in the 1980s did a policy of decentralisation pay of, strangely enough under the socialist-communist governments. Henceforth, some power has been transferred to twenty-two regions, each of which got its democratically elected council. Furthermore the prefectional system was abolished. However, people do not feel very attached to the new regions, and like before the Parisian political establishment still "parachutes" its politicians into the provinces, were they manage to be elected mayor of a commune, or at least deputy of a constituency, and dominate local politics.
The French have a reputation of being arrogant fighting cocks. However, in general their haughtiness concentrates on the superiority of French culture, rather than on expansionist policies. For example, French imperialism in Africa was not quite comparable to British politics of arrogance and cynicism towards its colonies. Instead of "respecting" the native cultures overseas by subordinating them, the French "mission civilatrice" aimed at the integration of "L'Afrique française", "L'Indo-Chine française", and the other colonies into "la douce France". The colonies were even represented in the Parisian parliament. Not that it mattered much: French Africa and Indo-china was not less exploited than the British colonies and the "departments overseas" were - like any other French department - ruled by Parisian bureaucrats. Even after decolonisation (in the early 1960s), "l'Afrique française" is still dominated by French culture, finance, and even soldiers: frequently local dictators in countries like Tchad and Mauretania are getting military aid to maintain order and oppress rebels. In addition to these (neo)colonial policies, French politicians - above all De Gaulle - have always tried to play the first fiddle in European politics, thus complaints about French arrogance are not without any foundation. However, in general the French are not really interested in conquering the world. Victor Hugo once wrote that they prefer Glory to Power: they love their country and culture, but are too individualistic to fight for it. Besides, they are not really interested in the outside world, with the exception of their Spanish and Dutch agrarian rivals, and their main trading partner: Germany. Of old, European integration has only been an issue for the intellectual élite. Montesquieu in his "lettres persanes" (1721, p.207) already described the often presumed French "arrogance" as being rather harmless: "Quand je te dis qu'ils méprisent tout ce qui est étranger, je ne parle que des bagatelles: car, sur les choses importantes, ils semblent s'être méfiés d'eux-mêmes jusqu'à se dégrader. Ils avouent de bon coeur que les autres peuples sont plus sages, pourvu qu'on convienne qu'ils sont mieux vêtus".
© Sylvester Hoogmoed, 1995
References
Montesquieu, C.L. de - Lettres persanes. Garnier (1960), Paris, 1721
Peyrefitte, A. - Le mal français. Plon, Paris, 1976
Smith, A.D. - National identity and the idea of European unity. International Affairs 68 (1992), 1, 55-76
Thomson, D. - Democracy in France since 1870. Cassel Publishers Limited (5th ed. 1969), London, 1946
